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ARTICLES 
Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage 
STEVEN G. CALABRESI* & HANNAH M. BEGLEY** 
This article examines the original meaning of the equal-
ity guarantee in American constitutional law. It looks are the 
seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth century roots of the 
modern doctrine, and it concludes that the Fourteenth 
Amendment bans the Hindu Caste system, European feudal-
ism, the Black Codes, the Jim Crow laws, and the common 
law's denial to women of equal civil rights to those held by 
men. It then considers the constitutionality of bans on same 
sex marriage from an Originalist perspective, and it con-
cludes that State laws banning same sex marriage violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important public civil rights issues of the mod-
ern era is whether the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion, as originally understood and modified by reading it through the 
lens of the Nineteenth Amendment, protects a right to same-sex 
                                                                                                             
 *  Clayton J. & Henry R. Barber Professor of Law, Northwestern Pritzker 
School of Law; Visiting Professor of Fall 2013-2015 Yale University; Visiting 
Scholar, 2015-2016 Brown University. 
 **  Brown University, Class of 2015. 
2016] ORIGINALISM AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 649 
 
marriage. We believe it does, and we seek in this article to briefly 
explain why we reach the conclusion we do. Further, we hope to add 
additional academic support for Justice Kennedy’s recent majority 
opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges,1 which we found to be lacking in 
originalist justification. Our conclusion that the Equal Protection 
Clause safeguards a right to same-sex marriage grows out of the 
original history of equality guarantees in Anglo-American laws as 
they have been applied by the U.S. Supreme Court. In other words, 
we seek here to offer an originalist argument for the right to same-
sex marriage, bolstering Justice Kennedy’s Obergefell opinion and 
addressing some of the concerns of the dissenting Justices in that 
case. 
We must begin by noting that no Supreme Court Justice or legal 
scholar to date has made a clear case as to what the original meaning 
of the Equal Protection Clause really is. We do not think that 
originalists—including Justice Thomas and former Justice Scalia—
could plausibly argue with a straight face, as William Rehnquist 
used to do, that the Equal Protection Clause applies only to race, 
while arguing that the Due Process Clause applies to all persons. 
The text of the Equal Protection Clause explicitly says that it applies 
to all persons, and the text of the Equal Protection Clause does not 
mention race as the only kind of discrimination the Clause protects 
against.2 This is unlike the text of the Fifteenth Amendment, which 
does precisely that by singling out “race, color, or previous condi-
tion of servitude” as factors that cannot be used to limit an individ-
ual’s right to vote.3 Former Chief Justice William Rehnquist was a 
conservative legal realist who, at best, was interested in the original 
“intent” underlying the Equal Protection Clause, and he showed no 
interest in the original public meaning of that Clause.4 In contrast, 
all modern originalists, including most definitely Justice Thomas 
and former Justice Scalia, were and are original public meaning tex-
tualists, and we can pretty much guarantee that if you look up the 
meaning of “person” in any dictionary from 1868, it is not going to 
                                                                                                             
 1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 3 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 4 See generally Sue Davis, Justice Rehnquist’s Equal Protection Clause: An 
Interim Analysis, 63 NEB. L. REV. 288 (1984). See also Rehnquist, The Notion of 
a Living Constitution, 54 TEX L. REV. 693 (1976). 
650 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:648 
 
say that only black and white people are persons. Originalist schol-
ars and Justice Thomas need to come to terms with the fact that the 
Rehnquist reading of the original intent of the Equal Protection 
Clause in the 1970s is as out of step with modern day originalism as 
bell bottoms and sideburns are out of step with modern day modes 
of dressing and shaving. 
Modern day originalism has been defined by Justice Clarence 
Thomas and by former Justice Scalia.5 According to Justice Scalia’s 
theory, the original public meaning of constitutional texts are of par-
amount importance when determining what actions and laws are 
constitutional.6 Justice Scalia’s methodology suggests that one 
ought to take a close look at state constitutions prior to 1868, and to 
contemporary speeches, articles, and dictionaries that were widely 
publicized at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s passage in 
order to determine the original public meaning of the Amendment.7 
Such sources provide the contextual background in which new con-
stitutional law is made. Notably, the interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment presented herein—that it bans systems of caste- and 
class-based discrimination—is supported by newspaper accounts, 
public speeches, and contemporary discussions of the Amendment.8 
It is worth noting that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment presented herein also happens to be supported by the legisla-
tive history of the Fourteenth Amendment in Congress, a legal 
source that Justice Scalia would have disfavored looking at.9 
                                                                                                             
 5 MODERN AMERICA AND THE LEGACY OF THE FOUNDING 65 (Ronald J. 
Pestritto & Thomas G. West eds., Lexington Books 2007). 
 6 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of 
the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann 
ed., 1998). 
 7 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856–
57 (1988). 
 8 See Editorial, Class Legislation, CHI TRIB., Jan. 12, 1866, at 2; Editorial, 
DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 5, 1866 at 2, col. 1; Editorial, Constitutional 
Amendments, PHILA. N. AM. & U.S. GAZETTE, Feb. 15, 1866, at 2; Editorial, 
Southern Sentiment, S.F. DAILY EVENING BULL., Nov. 9, 1866, at 2, col 2. See 
also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 674, 674, 686 (1867); CONG. GLOBE, 
36th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 119, 120 (1861); CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 1st Sess. 
app. 712, 713 (1852). 
 9 Scalia, supra note 6, at 16–18. 
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In the Fall of 1996, former Justice Scalia—in a speech at Cath-
olic University—explained his and our approach to constitutional 
interpretation: 
The theory of originalism treats a constitution like a 
statute, and gives it the meaning the words were un-
derstood to bear at the time they were promulgated. 
You will sometimes hear it described as the theory of 
original intent. You will never hear me refer to orig-
inal intent, because as I say I am first of all a textual-
ist, and secondly an originalist. If you are a textualist, 
you don’t care about the intent, and I don’t care if the 
framers of the Constitution had some secret meaning 
in mind when they adopted its words. I take the 
words as they were promulgated to the people of the 
United States, and what is the fairly understood 
meaning of those words . . . . The words are the law. 
I think that’s what is meant by a government of laws, 
not of men. We are bound not by the intent of our 
legislators, but by the laws they enacted, which are 
set forth in words, of course.10 
Former Justice Scalia’s approach of focusing on the original 
meaning of the words included in the text allows for consideration 
of the public context and understanding of what an Amendment ac-
complished when it was enacted, but it wisely forbids recourse to 
the legislative history.11 Consideration of state constitutions prior to 
1868, public statements about caste and class legislation prior to 
1868, and commentary in the public press when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was adopted are all relevant to the original public 
meaning under his approach. We think these sources all suggest that 
just as the word “person” in the Due Process Clause protects 
                                                                                                             
 10 BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, SCALIA: A COURT OF ONE 246 (2014); see also 
Tom Levinson, Confrontation, Fidelity, Transformation: The Fundamentalist Ju-
dicial Persona of Justice Atonin Scalia, 26 PACE L. REV. 445, 447 n.10 (2006); 
Adam J. White, Toward the Framers’ Understanding of “Advice and Consent”: 
A Historical and Textual Inquiry, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 108–109 n.26 
(2005). 
 11 Scalia, supra note 6, at 16–18. 
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LGBTQ people, so too does the word “person” in the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Both Clauses protect LGBTQ people from caste-based 
or class legislation. 
For the purposes of this paper, we will rely on the definition of 
class- and caste-based legislation espoused in Professor Calabresi’s 
earlier article concerning crony capitalism.12 Therein, Professor Cal-
abresi defined class legislation as “any legislation which singles out 
groups or individuals or classes of people and grants them special 
privileges or imposes on them special burdens,” such that these 
“privileges or burdens are not shared by the rest of society.”13 Caste 
legislation, on the other hand, refers to divisions of the population 
based on “hereditary class traits which may be immutable (such as 
race, or other physical features) or which are theoretically mutable 
like gender, although they are practically immutable because of so-
cial attitudes.”14 During the antebellum period, class- and caste-
based laws “were often called ‘special’ or ‘partial’ laws because 
they did not apply to the people as a whole and because they often 
granted monopolies or other special privileges to a favored group or 
imposed unique burdens on a particular disfavored group.”15 It is 
our contention that the Fourteenth Amendment bars such class- and 
caste-based legislation. 
We recognize, of course, that the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
clearly bar sex discrimination—or its cousin sexual orientation dis-
crimination—as a form of caste until the passage of the Nineteenth 
Amendment in 1920. That Amendment made clear that for political 
rights, sex discrimination was just as unconstitutional as race dis-
crimination.16 At the same time, we think that it became very hard 
to explain, after 1920, why women ought to have equal political 
rights to vote for president, senators, and governors under the Nine-
teenth Amendment, but not also equal civil rights to make contracts 
                                                                                                             
 12 Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa Price, Monopolies and the Constitution: A 
History of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J. L. PUB. POL’Y 983, 1024–25 (2013). 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. at 1025. 
 15 Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and the Equal Protection 
Clause: Why the Constitution Requires School Vouchers, 65 FLA. L. REV. 909, 
934 (2013). 
 16 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
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and own property without their husbands consent under the Four-
teenth Amendment. Instead, we believe that under the Fourteenth 
Amendment—which bans systems of caste or of class-based law-
making—women are guaranteed equal civil rights as well as politi-
cal rights. Otherwise, they would be second-class citizens.  We thus 
think that the Nineteenth Amendment changed the way in which 
American legal scholars and judges ought to think about the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Constitution is a holistic document and the 
Nineteenth Amendment altered everything that went before it in-
cluding the meaning of the “no discrimination” guarantee in the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
We think that the Fourteenth Amendment banned, as a matter of 
its original public meaning, all systems of caste or of class-based 
legislation. Many of our reasons for thinking this are set out in Pro-
fessor Calabresi’s law review article with Julia Rickert on “Original-
ism and Sex Discrimination.”17 The evidence suggests that the 
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought the Amendment 
would have banned introduction of the Hindu Caste system into the 
United States or a return to European feudalism where some people 
are born nobles and others serfs.18 The evil of slavery was, in part, 
that people were born either slave owners or slaves. This was also 
the evil of the Hindu Caste system and of European feudalism. There 
is abundant evidence from the time period even prior to the Civil 
War that state constitutions banned European style feudalism.19 
Moreover, we think that laws against miscegenation were un-
constitutional, as the Supreme Court rightly held in Loving v. Vir-
ginia, because they did not give an individual black person the same 
right to enter a marriage contract with an individual white person as 
a white person enjoyed.20 Such laws thus formally discriminated 
against individuals on account of race. Professor Calabresi and An-
                                                                                                             
 17 See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex 
Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
 18 Id. at 35–42. 
 19 Id. at 40–41. See also PA. CONST. OF 1776, arts. I–V; S.C. CONST. of 1778, 
art. XXXVIII. 
 20 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
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drea Matthews have made an originalist argument to this effect en-
titled “Originalism and Loving v. Virginia.”21 Using the same rea-
soning, a law that allows a man to marry a woman but not another 
man formally discriminates against that individual on account of 
sex. Under United States v. Virginia (the VMI Case), such laws can 
only be upheld if there is an exceedingly persuasive justification for 
them that survives skeptical scrutiny.22 There is no such justification 
here. 
Our argument proceeds in the following steps. In Part I, we ad-
dress the history of constitutional equality guarantees. In Part II, we 
apply the constitutional equality guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as it is modified by the subsequent adoption of the 
Nineteenth Amendment, to the question of the constitutionality of 
bans on same-sex marriage given the original meaning of those 
amendments. We conclude that originalism must lead to the conclu-
sion that bans on same-sex marriage are unconstitutional, and that 
Obergefell v. Hodges was thereby correctly decided. 
I. HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITY GUARANTEES 
In an article in the New York University Journal of Law & Lib-
erty, Professor Calabresi presents an argument concerning the his-
tory of equality guarantees in the United States.23 Therein, he said 
that: 
The [modern] concern with equality . . . grew out of 
the Reformation, which emphasized that all men and 
women were equally children of God; capable them-
selves of reading and interpreting for themselves the 
Bible; which was written not in Latin, Greek, or He-
brew, but in the vernacular; and which was available 
to everyone thanks to the invention of the printing 
press. Thus one can find from the 1640’s on various 
                                                                                                             
 21 See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and 
Loving v. Virgina, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1393 (2012). 
 22 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531–34 (1996). 
 23 Steven G. Calabresi, On Liberty, Equality, and the Constitution: A Review 
of Richard A. Epstein’s The Classical Liberal Constitution, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 839, 882–884 (2014). 
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striking assertions about human equality. The Mas-
sachusetts Body of Liberties, 1641, for example, pro-
vided in Article 2 that: “Every person within this Ju-
risdiction, Whether Inhabitant or forreiner shall en-
joy the same justice and law, that is general for the 
plantation, which we constitute and execute one to-
wards another without partialitie or delay.”24 This 
would seem to be on its face a forerunner of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
In England in 1649, the famous poet John Milton—who was the 
house intellectual of Oliver Cromwell before he gave up on politics 
to be a poet—justified the execution of King Charles I and the re-
jection of the Divine Right of Kings on equality grounds. Milton 
wrote that: 
No man who knows aught, can be so stupid to deny 
that all men naturally were born free, being the image 
and resemblance of God himself . . . .It follows . . .  
that since the king or magistrate holds his authority 
of the people, both originally and naturally for their 
good in the first place, and not his own, then may the 
people as oft as they shall judge it for the best, either 
choose him or reject him, retain him or depose him, 
though no tyrant, merely by the liberty and right of 
freeborn men to be governed as seems to them best.25 
Thomas Hobbes, writing in Leviathan, said that: 
Nature has made men so equal in their faculties of 
the body and mind as that . . . when all is reckoned 
together the difference between man and man is not 
so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim 
to himself any benefit to which another may not pre-
tend as well as he. For as to the strength of the body, 
                                                                                                             
 24 Id. at 883 (quoting BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 72 (1971)). 
 25 Id. (quoting John Milton, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (1649), 
reprinted in THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORY, CASES, AND 
PHILOSOPHY 72, 74 (Douglas W. Kmiec & Stephen B. Presser eds., 1998)). 
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the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, 
either by secret machination or by confederacy with 
others that are in the same danger with himself. As to 
the faculties of the mind . . . I find yet a greater equal-
ity among men than that of strength.26 
John Locke, writing in The Second Treatise of Government, said 
much the same thing. Locke wrote that: 
To understand political power right and derive it 
from its original we must consider what state all men 
are naturally in, and that is a state of perfect freedom 
to order their actions and possessions and persons as 
they think fit, within the bounds of nature, without 
asking leave or depending upon the will of any other 
man. A state also of equality, wherein all the power 
and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more 
than another; there being nothing more evident than 
that creatures of the same species and rank, promis-
cuously born to all the same advantages of nature and 
the use of the same faculties, should also be equal 
one amongst another without subordination or sub-
jection; unless the lord and master of them all should, 
by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above 
another, and confer on him by an evident and clear 
appointment an undoubted right to dominion and 
sovereignty.27 
We contend that this Lockean focus on equality and freedom—
born primarily out of the unrest inherent in the volatile state of na-
ture—had a visible and clear impact on the written work of the 
American revolutionaries.28 In the Virginia Declaration of Rights, 
published roughly one month before the Declaration of Independ-
ence in June of 1776, George Mason penned the following: 
                                                                                                             
 26 Id. at 883 (quoting Milton, supra note 25, at 77–78). 
 27 Id. at 884 (quoting Milton, supra note 25, at 102). 
 28 See Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, The Law and the Dissenting 
Opinions in Obergefell v. Hodges, 8 ELON L. REV. 1 (2016). 
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A declaration of rights made by the Representatives 
of the good People of Virginia, assembled in full and 
free Convention; which rights do pertain to them, and 
their posterity, as the basis and Foundation of Gov-
ernment. 
SECTION I. That all men are by nature equally free 
and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of 
which, when they enter into a state of society, they 
cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their pos-
terity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with 
the means of acquiring and possessing property, and 
pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. 
SECTION 2. That all power is vested in, and conse-
quently derived from, the people; that Magistrates are 
their trustees and servants and at all times amenable 
to them. 
SECTION 3. That government is, or ought to be, in-
stituted for the common benefit, protection, and se-
curity of the people, nation, or community. Of all the 
various modes and forms of government, that is best, 
which is capable of producing the greatest degree of 
happiness and safety, and is most effectually secured 
against the danger of mal-administration; and that 
when any government shall be found inadequate or 
contrary to these purposes, a majority of the commu-
nity hath an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasi-
ble right to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner 
as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal. 
SECTION 4. That no man, or set of men, are entitled 
to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges 
from the community, but in consideration of public 
services; which not being descendible, neither ought 
the offices of Magistrate, Legislator, or Judge, to be 
hereditary.29 
                                                                                                             
 29 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 1–4 (1776) (emphasis added). 
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Implicit in the italicized language above are the equality-centric 
ideals of John Milton, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke. All three 
scholars contended that all people were born free and equal, and that 
the status of personhood intrinsically grants all individuals the right 
to be treated in substantively similar ways by the government. In the 
same vein, the Virginia Declaration of Rights emphasized the im-
portance of equality alongside its focus on the inalienable rights of 
life, liberty, and property. Taken together, these documents indicate 
that equality requires the government to protect individuals from 
class- and caste-based discrimination, since no person should be 
treated as inherently lesser than another for arbitrary reasons such as 
heredity. These same ideals were embraced by Thomas Jefferson 
when he included George Mason’s equality-centric language in the 
Declaration of Independence: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men 
are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among 
these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. 
That to secure these rights, Governments are insti-
tuted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed; that whenever any Form of 
Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is 
the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to 
institute new Government, laying its foundation on 
such principles and organizing its powers in such 
form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their 
Safety and Happiness.30 
This Lockean language championing freedom and equality ap-
pears not only in the Virginia Declaration of Rights, but also in sev-
eral other state declarations of rights, all of which were adopted dur-
ing roughly the same time period.31 For example, in 1977, New York 
fully incorporated the Declaration of Independence in its own state 
constitution—evidence that individuals drafting the New York state 
                                                                                                             
 30 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis 
added). 
 31 Calabresi, supra note 23, at 885. 
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constitution valued these equality-centric ideals.32 Likewise, in 
1776, the state of Delaware incorporated similar ideals into its state 
constitution, writing that “all government of right originates from 
the people, is founded in compact only, and instituted solely for the 
good of the whole,” and in Section 3 that “all persons professing the 
Christian religion ought forever to enjoy equal rights and privileges 
in this state, unless, under colour of religion, any man disturb the 
peace, the happiness or safety of society.”33 Maryland offers an ad-
ditional example in Section XXXIII of its 1776 Declaration of 
Rights, stating “[t]hat, as it is the duty of every man to worship God 
in such manner as he thinks most acceptable to him; all persons, 
professing the Christian religion, are equally entitled to protection 
in their religious liberty . . . .”34 In the same vein, the Pennsylvania 
Constitution of 1776, adopted on September 28th, declared in com-
paratively strong language: 
I. That all men are born equally free and independ-
ent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable 
rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defend-
ing life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and pro-
tecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happi-
ness and safety.  *** 
II. That all men have a natural and unalienable right 
to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of 
their own consciences and understanding: *** 
III. That the people of this State have the sole, exclu-
sive and inherent right of governing and regulating 
the internal police of the same. 
IV. That all power being originally inherent in, and 
consequently derived from, the people; therefore all 
officers of government, whether legislative or exec-
utive, are their trustees and servants, and at all times 
accountable to them. 
                                                                                                             
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
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V. That government is, or ought to be, instituted for 
the common benefit, protection and security of the 
people, nation or community; and not for the partic-
ular emolument or advantage of any single man, fam-
ily, or sett of men, who are a part only of that com-
munity, ***35 
On December 18, 1776, North Carolina made a similar declara-
tion, that: 
I. That all political power is vested in and derived 
from the people only. 
II. That the people of this State ought to have the sole 
and exclusive right of regulating the internal govern-
ment and police thereof. 
III. That no man or set of men are entitled to exclu-
sive or separate emoluments or privileges from the 
community, but in consideration of public services. 
*** 
XXII. That no hereditary emoluments, privileges or 
honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State. 
XXIII. That perpetuities and monopolies are con-
trary to the genius of a free State, and ought not to be 
allowed.36 
Notably, other state constitutions from the Founding Era contain 
similar sentiments. Even South Carolina’s equality guarantee, which 
was the narrowest of the bunch, mentioned equality-centric ideals in 
Article XXXVIII, stating: 
[t]hat all persons and religious societies who 
acknowledge that there is one God, and a future state 
of rewards and punishments, and that God is publicly 
to be worshipped, shall be freely tolerated. The 
                                                                                                             
 35 PA. CONST. OF 1776, arts. I–V (emphasis added); Calabresi, supra note 23, 
at 885–86. 
 36 N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 1–3, 22, 23 (1776) (emphasis added); 
Calabresi, supra note 23, at 886. 
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Christian Protestant religion shall be deemed, and is 
hereby constituted and declared to be, the established 
religion of this State. That all denominations of 
Christian Protestants in this State, demeaning them-
selves peaceably and faithfully, shall enjoy equal re-
ligious and civil privileges.37 
In comparison, other states protected equality to a significantly 
greater extent. The Massachusetts’ Constitution of 1780 said that: 
Art. I.—All men are born free and equal, and have 
certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; 
among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying 
and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquir-
ing, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that 
of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness. 
II.—It is the right as well as the duty of all men in 
society, publicly, and at stated seasons, to worship 
the SUPREME BEING, the great creator and pre-
server of the universe. And no subject shall be hurt, 
molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or es-
tate, for worshipping GOD in the manner and season 
most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; 
or for his religious profession or sentiments; pro-
vided he doth not disturb the public peace, or obstruct 
others in their religious worship. *** 
VI.—No man, nor corporation, or association of 
men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or 
particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from 
those of the community, than what arises from the 
consideration of services rendered to the public; and 
this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor 
transmissible to children, or descendants, or rela-
tions by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, 
lawgiver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural. 
                                                                                                             
 37 Calabresi, supra note 23, at 886 (quoting S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. 
XXXVIII) (emphasis added). 
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VII.—Government is instituted for the common 
good; for the protection, safety, prosperity and hap-
piness of the people; and not for the profit, honor, or 
private interest of any one man, family, or class of 
men; Therefore the people alone have an incontesti-
ble, unalienable, and indefeasible right to institute 
government; and to reform, alter, or totally change 
the same, when their protection, safety, prosperity 
and happiness require it.38 
At the same time, the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 said 
that: 
All men are born equally free and independent; 
therefore, all government of right originates from the 
people, is founded in consent, and instituted for the 
general good. 
II. All men have certain natural, essential, and inher-
ent rights. among which are—the enjoying and de-
fending life and liberty—acquiring, possessing and 
protecting property—and in a word, of seeking and 
obtaining happiness. *** 
X. Government being instituted for the common ben-
efit, protection, and security of the whole commu-
nity, and not for the private interest or emolument of 
any one man, family or class of men; therefore, 
whenever the ends of government are perverted, and 
public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other 
means of redress are ineffectual, the people may, and 
of right ought, to reform the old, or establish a new 
government.39 
Finally, a few states—such as New Jersey and Georgia—”did 
not use Lockean Bill of Rights language, and Connecticut and 
                                                                                                             
 38 Id. at 886–87 (quoting MASS. CONST. arts. I–II, VI–VII (1780)) (emphasis 
added). 
 39 Id. at 887 (quoting N.H. CONST. of 1784) (emphasis added). 
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Rhode Island stayed with their colonial charters.”40 These states 
were the rare localities that did not emphasize Lockean equality 
guarantees in their own constitutional documents. However, we 
would like to note that the Rhode Island Charter issued by King 
Charles II in 1663 to Roger Williams stated: 
That our royal will and pleasure is, that no person 
within the said colony, at any time hereafter shall be 
any wise molested, punished, disquieted, or called in 
question, for any differences in opinion in matters of 
religion, and do not actually disturb the civil peace 
of our said colony; but that all and every person and 
persons may, from time to time, and at all times here-
after, freely and fully have and enjoy his and their 
own judgments and consciences, in matters of reli-
gious concernments, throughout the tract of land 
hereafter mentioned, they behaving themselves 
peaceably and quietly, and not using this liberty to 
licentiousness and profaneness, nor to the civil injury 
or outward disturbance of others, any law, statute, or 
clause therein contained, or to be contained, usage or 
custom of this realm, to the contrary hereof, in any 
wise notwithstanding.41 
In the end, we think that there is a plethora of evidence support-
ing the idea that the language of the Declaration of Independence 
was not an “isolated rhetorical frill from the pen of Thomas Jeffer-
son, a slave owner.”42 Quite the contrary, this language reflects 
“widespread social acceptance of Lockeanism in 1776 and during 
the founding period more generally.”43 As such, American history 
and tradition—at least concerning constitutional matters—rests 
upon a respect for equality that mandates the prohibition of caste- 
and class-based legislation. This conclusion follows from an under-
standing that since all men are born free and equal, they must be 
                                                                                                             
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 887–88 (quoting R.I. COLONIAL CHARTER of 1663) (emphasis 
added). 
 42 See id. 
 43 Id. 
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treated with fundamental parity and must not be treated preferen-
tially based on their hereditary background. The Articles of Confed-
eration—though admittedly less clear on this front—also indicate a 
strong focus on the equality of men. Indeed, Article IV of that doc-
ument states: 
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship 
and intercourse among the people of the different 
States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of 
these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from 
justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges 
and immunities of free citizens in the several States.44 
The Clause above seems far ahead of its time. By intentionally 
using the words “the free inhabitants,” this Clause appears to have 
purposefully included African American freedmen in its resounding 
guarantee of equal treatment. Although some Northern states al-
lowed free African Americans to vote at this time (an incredibly pro-
gressive fact in and of itself), granting such individuals “all of the 
privileges and immunities of free citizens” was a remarkably pres-
cient and enlightened decision. Our analysis above shows that the 
“Privileges or Immunities Clauses” and the “Common Benefit 
Clauses” both use this language in an anti-feudal way, banning 
caste- or class-based legislation that unduly benefits one group 
based on their family pedigree or upbringing. By extension, the lan-
guage here ought to be read as granting the same protections to Af-
rican Americans, safeguarding all free people from laws that privi-
lege groups based on their hereditary class. During the reign of the 
Articles of Confederation, then, none of the states could attempt to 
disadvantage or discriminate against out-of-state residents when 
they were within another state, including African Americans. 
Like the Articles of Confederation, the American Constitution 
also contain a Privileges and Immunities Clause, which is nestled in 
Article IV, Section 2. It states that: “The Citizens of each State shall 
be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several 
States.”45 
                                                                                                             
 44 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1771, art. IV, para. 1 (emphasis added). 
 45 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (emphasis added). 
2016] ORIGINALISM AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 665 
 
Here, while the phrase “the citizens of each state” may seem to 
exclude African Americans, a fuller reading of the Constitution 
would indicate that free African Americans were once again in-
cluded in this grant of equality. Indeed, this is because the term “cit-
izens of each state” was defined, in the minds of the public, by ref-
erencing the collective understanding of citizenship at the time. 
Such a collective understanding would have been integrally built 
upon the Articles of Confederation, as it was a principal document 
in American history. Since Article IV of the Articles of Confedera-
tion clearly stated that the citizens of each state were “the free in-
habitants of each of these States,” this could be taken as evidence 
that African Americans were granted expansive equality in the Con-
stitution when it was written in 1787. Of course, the formal text of 
the Articles of Confederation and the American Constitution were 
often ignored and were certainly not followed perfectly in this re-
gard—indeed, these equality-centric principles were seemingly dis-
carded during the boom of enslavement following the invention of 
the Cotton Gin. Nonetheless, our two major founding texts—the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, as read through 
the lens of Article 4 of the Articles of Confederation—are both clear 
on the question of equality. They are both committed to protecting 
the full and complete equality of all free inhabitants, at least in ref-
erence to the privileges and immunities of state citizenship at the 
time. 
One possible objection to this line of argument could be that the 
Framers of the Constitution made a figurative “deal with the 
Devil,”46 purposefully neglecting to outlaw slavery in order to in-
centivize Southern states to join the Union. In this regard, one might 
argue that the Framers’ silence could be taken as evidence that 
equality-centric values were not as important to the Framers as we 
suggest. However, even if the Framers did make such a devilish 
deal, they did not take any specific action that would revoke the en-
titlement that all free African American had—under both the Con-
stitution and the Article of Confederation—to all of the privileges 
and immunities of state citizenship. This is crucially important be-
cause it means that free African American retained a substantial ar-
ray of rights including some state voting rights, at least based on the 
                                                                                                             
 46 Calabresi, supra note 23, at 889. 
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formal text of the Constitution. We want to emphasize, then, that 
while the Three-Fifths Compromise, the Fugitive Slave Clause, and 
the “allowance of importation of new slaves until 1868 were a great 
evil,” they did not, either implicitly or explicitly, hamper the state 
citizenship rights that free African Americans were granted in the 
Article of Confederation, and which Article IV, Section 2 of the 
Constitution upheld. 
Our thinking on the slavery issue has been greatly shaped by a 
wonderful book: Sons of Providence: The Brown Brothers, the Slave 
Trade, and the American Revolution.47 It recounts the life-long 
struggle between John Brown, the founder of Brown University, a 
warrior for American Independence, and an evil slave trader with 
his younger brother, Moses Brown, a passionate Quaker abolition-
ist.48 Rappleye points out that in 1774, two years before Thomas 
Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence, “[t]he second ar-
ticle of the Continental Association,” said explicitly that: “We will 
neither import nor purchase, any slave imported after the first of De-
cember next; after which time we will wholly discontinue the slave 
trade, and will be neither concerned in it ourselves, nor will we hire 
our vessels, nor sell our commodities or manufactures to those who 
are concerned in it.”49 As Professor Calabresi explains elsewhere, 
This was an astonishing step [for the First Continen-
tal Congress to take] toward abolition [of slavery] by 
a “legislature” which lacked constitutional powers 
and even a country of its own at the time. (Evidently, 
some of those fighting for liberty from England in the 
1770s appreciated that there was something incon-
gruous in their enslaving others.)  After the adoption 
                                                                                                             
 47 See generally CHARLES RAPPLEYE, SONS OF PROVIDENCE: THE BROWN 
BROTHERS, THE SLAVE TRADE, AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (Simon & 
Schuster, 2006). 
 48 See id. at 1–3. 
 49 Id. at 148. 
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of this resolution, the slavery issue would not resur-
face in government until after peace with England 
was achieved in the 1780s.50 
At this time, historical figures such as Moses Brown petitioned 
the Continental Government (which was the federal government un-
der the Articles of Confederation) to prevent the spread of slavery 
or even to outlaw slavery in its entirety. The national government 
was far too weak—based on its lack of tax revenue and the compar-
ative strength of state power over federal power at the time—to pass 
a full and complete slavery ban.51 However, the Continental Con-
gress was able to act in a fairly expansive regard when it banned 
slavery in the Northwest Territory, which ultimately grew into the 
states of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, and part of 
Minnesota.52 This ban on slavery in the North, known as the North-
west Ordinance, virtually guaranteed that a national government 
would forge itself in the North, the Midwest, and the West, eventu-
ally growing strong enough to abolish slavery in the South and 
clinch a decisive victory in the Civil War.53 Benjamin Franklin and 
Alexander Hamilton contributed to the spread of this mindset, help-
ing to shape the Northwest Ordinance by strengthening the wide-
spread acceptance of abolitionist values like equality.54 It is worth 
noting that the Northwest Ordinance paved the way for the Missouri 
Compromise, which banned slavery in the territories north of the 
Mason-Dixon Line, but permitted slavery south of it.55 Later, in the 
Dred Scott case,56 the Supreme Court invalidated the Missouri Com-
promise, which many scholars suggest led directly to the Civil 
War.57 
                                                                                                             
 50 MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN, STEVENS G. CALABRESI, MICHAEL W. 
MCCONNELL, & SAMUEL L. BRAY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
74 (2nd ed. 2013). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 75. 
 53 Id. at 74–75. 
 54 Id. at 75–76. 
 55 Id. at 769–70. 
 56 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 528–29 (1857), superseded 
by constitutional amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 
 57 Id. See also PAULSEN, supra note 50, at 770–71. See generally Dr. Roberta 
Alexander, Dred Scott: The Decision that Sparked a Civil War, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 
643 (2007). 
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Following the passage of the Constitution, Moses Brown once 
again called for the federal government to ban slavery, asking the 
House of Representatives in 1790 to take decisive action.58 James 
Madison agreed that something must be done, contending that cer-
tain federal powers such as the commerce power could be wielded 
as a weapon to discourage immoral or unethical abuses of the peo-
ple.59 As Professor Calabresi has written elsewhere, Moses Brown’s 
leadership and James Madison’s craftiness led to the passage of a 
bill in 1794 that was called: “An Act to Forbid the Carrying on of 
the Slave Trade from the United States to any Foreign Place or 
Country.” Notably, the Act was more than just symbolic, because it 
carried substantial enforcement penalties.60 Ultimately, President 
George Washington chose to sign the bill into federal law.61 After a 
delay, in 1807, the Thomas Jefferson and his administration success-
fully abolished the slave trade in the United States once and for all, 
delivering a heavy blow to the international slave trade and empha-
sizing, once again, our nation’s commitment to Lockean ideals of 
equality.62 
The Framers clearly did not have a spotless record when it comes 
to the issue of slavery and when it comes to their handling of the 
rights of free African Americans. Yet still, the Framers made serious 
advances and left hooks in the Constitution so that, over time, a na-
tional government could rise up and become sufficiently powerful 
and motivated on the subject, eventually abolishing slavery from the 
United States altogether. We think it is important to recognize the 
contribution of the Founders in this regard, because their contribu-
tion to the abolitionist effort is currently under-appreciated in aca-
demia. This contribution even spills into the modern day. In the case 
of same-sex marriage, we now see the American people emphasiz-
ing the importance of Lockean ideals of equality in a new realm. 
Throughout time, the American constitutional tradition has valued 
                                                                                                             
 58 PAULSEN, supra note 50, at 75. 
 59 Id. at 75–76. See also RAPPLEYE, supra note 47, at 295 (“[C]ongress have 
no authority to interfere with the emancipation of slaves, or in the treatment of 
them.”). 
 60 Act To Prohibit the Importation of Slaves into Any Port or Place Within 
the Jurisdiction of the United States, ch. 22, § 2 Stat. 426 (1807). 
 61 PAULSEN, supra note 50. 
 62 Act To Prohibit the Importation of Slaves into Any Port or Place Within 
the Jurisdiction of the United States, ch. 22, § 2 Stat. 426 (1807). 
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equal treatment under the law, which fundamentally bars the crea-
tion of caste- and class-based laws. 
During the Jacksonian period, much later in American history, a 
movement grew in the United States to prevent special interest 
groups or special hereditary classes from enjoying immunities or 
privileges not granted to all. Specifically, the common man was em-
powered to demand equal treatment from his government. Professor 
Calabresi has written extensively about this with co-authors in Mo-
nopolies and the Constitution: A History of Crony Capitalism and 
in Religions and the Equal Protection Clause: Why the Constitution 
Requires School Vouchers.63 This complaint was at the very heart of 
President Andrew Jackson’s campaign to kill the Bank of the United 
States, which he did kill, and which stayed dead, until 1913, when 
Woodrow Wilson created the Federal Reserve Board.64 The killing 
of the Bank of the United States on the ground that it was class-
based legislation, which set up a monopoly, is yet another instance 
in American history of the triumph of the equal protection idea. 
Over time—during the Jacksonian period, and throughout the 
Civil War and Reconstruction Era—abolitionists as a group came to 
equate slavery and servitude with class- and caste-based legislation 
that unduly benefits one group based on their family pedigree or up-
bringing, granting privileges to some individuals over others on 
highly suspect moral grounds.65 Slave owners did not compensate 
their slaves, did not treat them with respect or dignity, and did not 
afford them freedom or fair treatment. In this sense, slavery became 
objectionable precisely because it created divisions between groups 
of people that constitute caste- or class-based forms of discrimina-
tion.66  The debates on the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment 
feature some great quotes to this effect. Consider, for example, the 
words of Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner: 
                                                                                                             
 63 Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and the Consti-
tution: A History of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J. L. PUB. POL’Y 983, 1068–073 
(2013); Calabresi & Salander, supra note 15, at 945–45. 
 64 Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251, 251–253 (1913). 
 65 Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 63. 
 66 Calabresi & Salander, supra note 15, at 946–51. 
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[T]here shall be no Oligarchy, Aristocracy, Caste, or 
Monopoly invested with special powers and privi-
leges, and there shall be no denial of rights, civil or 
political, on account of color or race anywhere within 
the limits of the United States or the jurisdiction 
thereof; but all persons therein shall be equal before 
the law.67 
Senator Sumner elaborated saying: 
A Caste cannot exist except in defiance of the first 
principles of Christianity and the first principles of a 
Republic. It is Heathenism in religion and tyranny in 
government. The Brahmins and the Sudra in India, 
from generation to generation, have been separated, 
as the two races are now separated in these States. If 
a Sudra presumed to sit on a Brahmin’s carpet he was 
punished with banishment. But our recent rebels un-
dertake to play the part of the Brahmins, and exclude 
citizens, . . . on the ground of Caste, which according 
to its Portuguese origin, casta is only another term 
for race.68 
Finally, consider this remarkable statement from Senator 
Sumner: 
The Rebellion began in two assumptions  . . .  first, 
the sovereignty of the States with the pretended right 
of secession; and, secondly, the superiority of the 
white race, with the pretended right of Caste, Oligar-
chy, and Monopoly on account of color . . . .The sec-
ond showed itself at the beginning, when South Car-
olina alone, among the thirteen States, allowed her 
Constitution to be degraded by an exclusion on ac-
count of color . . . 69 
                                                                                                             
 67 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 674 (1867). 
 68 Id. at 683. 
 69 Id. at 686. 
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During the 1860s, other members of the legislature made similar 
comments, echoing the sentiment of Senator Sumner. For example, 
Representative John F. Farnsworth said: 
As a moral being, as a man, I hate slavery in the 
States of this Union as I hate serfdom in Russia—
which, by the way, is about to be abolished in that 
Empire, while we quarrel over the extension of slav-
ery in this—just as I hate caste in India; just as I hate 
oppression everywhere.70 
Representative Norton Townshend, a Democrat from Ohio, said: 
I protest against all these interpolations into the Dem-
ocratic creed, and against any interpretation of De-
mocracy as makes it the ally of slavery and oppres-
sion. Democracy and slavery are directly antagonis-
tic. Democracy is opposed to caste, slavery creates it; 
Democracy is opposed to special interest groups; 
slavery is but the privilege specially enjoyed by one 
class—to use another as brute beasts and take their 
labor without wages; Democracy is for elevating the 
laboring masses to the dignity of perfect manhood; 
slavery grinds the laborer into the very dust . . . 
[S]lavery is but the extreme of class legisla-
tion . . . .[S]lavery is nothing more than the privilege 
some have of living out of others . . . .71 
Together, we take these historical excerpts as illustrations of the 
Founding Era’s focus on equality, as well as its condemnation of 
class- and caste-based legislation. We think it is clear that the 
Founders disliked hereditary privileges and immunities, and we 
think they came to be strongly opposed preferential treatment for 
certain groups over others based on arbitrary reasons, like family 
background. These equality-centric ideals came to a head in the Re-
construction Era and in the three great constitutional amendments 
that followed: The Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery; 
                                                                                                             
 70 CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 119, 120 (1861). 
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the Fourteenth Amendment, which abolished all caste systems, in-
cluding racial discrimination in the Southern states; and the Fif-
teenth Amendment, which ensured that the voting rights of African 
Americans would be defended against infringement. While these 
were great victories for those who hold Lockean equality dear, we 
recognize that these reforms were woefully slow and that they were 
also cut short by discriminatory laws like the Jim Crow laws and the 
Grandfather Clauses validated in Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 
(1903). Fortunately, with the Second Reconstruction in the 1960s, 
the three great amendments finally gained full force in protecting all 
people from class- and caste-based discrimination. Finally the Re-
construction Amendments were given the strength that they de-
served. 
In a prior law review article with Sarah Agudo, Professor Cala-
bresi found that in 1868—which is the year when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified and became part of our fundamental law—
twenty-four of the thirty-seven state constitutions existing at that 
time (nearly a two-thirds majority) contained provisions guarantee-
ing inalienable, natural, or inherent rights of an unenumerated rights 
type.72 Thus, in 1868, approximately eighty-eight percent of all 
Americans resided in states that constitutionally protected unenu-
merated individual liberty rights.73 Throughout this article, we use 
the term “Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees” (or “the Guaran-
tees”) to refer to these unenumerated individual liberty rights guar-
antees. The Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees almost all essen-
tially followed the Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts 
clauses from the founding which had proclaimed that: “All men are 
born free and equal and have certain natural and inalienable rights 
                                                                                                             
 72 Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Con-
stitutions when the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights 
Are Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 88 
(2008). However, as this article explained, the Connecticut, Rhode Island, and 
Texas Guarantees were so atypical that it is not fully accurate to group them with 
the twenty-four true Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees. 
 73 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 72. The sixty-seven percent reflects the 
population that resided in the 24 States with true Lockean Natural Rights Guaran-
tees as of the 1870 census. This percentage was calculated from data available 
from the United States Census Bureau. United States Region and Divison State, 
Population: 1790 to 1990, CENSUS.GOV. (Aug. 26, 1993) http://www.cen-
sus.gov/population/www/censusdata/files/table-16.pdf. 
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among which are the right to enjoy life and liberty and to acquire, 
possess, and defend property.”74 We cannot stress strongly enough 
the significance of the fact that sixty-seven percent of all Americans 
living in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, lived 
in jurisdictions that emphasized that all men are born free and equal. 
If there is any right that is deeply rooted in American history and 
tradition, then, it is the right of all people to be free and equal at the 
time of their birth. It must be noted that the right of individuals to be 
free and equal at the time of their birth bars the creation of caste or 
class-based legislation. 
Moreover, the central claim of the Second Reconstruction made 
by the Reverend Martin Luther King was that: 
When the architects of our Republic wrote the mag-
nificent words of the Constitution and the Declara-
tion of Independence, they were signing a promis-
sory note to which every American was to fall heir. 
This note was a promise that all men, yes, black men 
as well as white men, would be guaranteed the unal-
ienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happi-
ness. It is obvious today that America has defaulted 
on this promissory note, insofar as her citizens of 
color are concerned. *** 
I say to you today my friends. And so even though 
we face the difficulties of today and tomorrow I, still 
have a dream. It is a dream deeply rooted in the 
American dream. I have a dream that one day this 
nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of 
its creed: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, 
that all men are created equal.”75 
Martin Luther King was right, and Americans knew he was right 
in arguing that Americans of every race and color were created 
equal. This is indeed at the heart of the American creed. 
                                                                                                             
 74 MASS. CONST., supra note 38, at art. I. 
 75 Dr. Martin Luther King, I have a Dream, Delivered at Lincoln Memorial, 
Washington, D.C., (Aug. 28, 1963), http://www.americanrheto-
ric.com/speeches/mlkihaveadream.htm. See also THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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Just as the Caste system of European feudalism spurred the in-
clusion of equality guarantees in the Declaration of Independence, 
and just as slavery and the Black Codes gave rise to the Reconstruc-
tion Amendment’s guarantees of equality, the existence of gender 
roles in which women lacked basic civil and political rights enjoyed 
by men led to another great step toward equality, when women got 
the political right to vote in all federal and state elections in 1920, 
with the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. 
The inspiration and need for the Nineteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution is best expressed in the Seneca Falls Declaration 
of 1848,76 which is worth quoting in full: 
The Declaration of Sentiments 
When, in the course of human events, it becomes 
necessary for one portion of the family of man to as-
sume among the people of the earth a position differ-
ent from that which they have hitherto occupied, but 
one to which the laws of nature and of nature’s God 
entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of man-
kind requires that they should declare the causes that 
impel them to such a course. 
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men 
and women are created equal; that they are endowed 
by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that 
among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap-
piness; that to secure these rights governments are 
instituted, deriving their just powers from the con-
sent of the governed. Whenever any form of govern-
ment becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right 
of those who suffer from it to refuse allegiance to it, 
and to insist upon the institution of a new govern-
ment, laying its foundation on such principles, and 
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall 
seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. 
Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long 
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established should not be changed for light and tran-
sient causes; and accordingly all experience hath 
shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer. 
[W]hile evils are sufferable, than to right themselves 
by abolishing the forms to which they are accus-
tomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpa-
tions, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a 
design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is 
their duty to throw off such government, and to pro-
vide new guards for their future security. Such has 
been the patient sufferance of the women under this 
government, and such is now the necessity which 
constrains them to demand the equal station to which 
they are entitled. The history of mankind is a history 
of repeated injuries and usurpations on the part of 
man toward woman, having in direct object the es-
tablishment of an absolute tyranny over her. To 
prove this, let facts be submitted to a candid world. 
The history of mankind is a history of repeated inju-
ries and usurpations on the part of man toward 
woman, having in direct object the establishment of 
an absolute tyrranny[sic] over her. To prove this, let 
facts be submitted to a candid world. 
He has never permitted her to exercise her inaliena-
ble right to the elective franchise. 
He has compelled her to submit to laws, in the for-
mation of which she had no voice. 
He has withheld from her rights which are given to 
the most ignorant and degraded men—both natives 
and foreigners. 
Having deprived her of this first right of a cit-
izedn[sic], the elective franchise, thereby leaving her 
without representation in the halls of legislation, he 
has oppressed her on all sides. 
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He has made her, if married, in the eye of the law, 
civilly dead. 
He has taken from her all right in property, even to 
the wages she earns. 
He has made her, morally, an irresponsible being, as 
she can commit many crimes with impunity, pro-
vided they be done in the presence of her husband. In 
the covenant of marriage, she is compelled to prom-
ise obedience to her husband, he becoming, to all in-
tents and purposes, her master—the law giving him 
power to deprive her of her liberty, and to administer 
chastisement. 
He has so framed the laws of divorce, as to what shall 
be the proper causes, and in case of separation, to 
whom the guardianship of the children shall be 
given, as to be wholly regardless[sic] of the happi-
ness of women—the law, in all cases, going upon a 
flase[sic] supposition of the supremacy of man, and 
giving all power into his hands. 
After depriving her of all rights as a married woman, 
if single, and the owner of property, he has taxed her 
to support a government which recognizes her only 
when her property can be made profitable to it. 
He has monopolized nearly all the profitable employ-
ments, and from those she is permitted to follow, she 
receives but a scanty remuneration. He closes against 
her all the avenues to wealth and distinction which 
he considers most homorable[sic] to himself. As a 
teacher of theology[sic], medicine, or law, she is not 
known. 
He has denied her the facilities for obtaining a thor-
ough education, all colleges being closed against her. 
He allows her in church, as well as state, but a sub-
orinate[sic] position, claiming apostolic authority for 
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her exclusion from the ministry, and, with some ex-
ceptions, from any public participation in the affairs 
of the church. 
He has created a false public sentiment by giving to 
the world a different code of morals for men and 
women, by which moral delinquencies which ex-
clude women from society, are not only tolerated, but 
deemed of little account in man. 
He has usurped the prerogative of Jehovah himself, 
claiming it as his right to assign for her a sphere of 
action, when that belongs to her conscience and to 
her God. 
He has endeavored, in every way that he could, to 
destroy her conficence[sic] in her own powers, to 
lessen her self-respect, and to make her willing to 
lead a dependent and abject life. 
Now, in view of this entire disfranchisement of one-
half the people of this country, their social and reli-
gious degradation—in view of the unjust laws above 
mentioned, and because women do feel themselves 
aggrieved, oppressed, and fraudulently deprived of 
their most sacred rights, we insist that they have im-
mediate admission to all the rights and privileges 
which belong to them as citizens of the United 
States.77 
After decades of struggle, and in light of the Seneca Falls Dec-
laration of Sentiments, We the People of the United States adopted 
the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution giving women equal 
political voting rights with men. Shortly after that momentous and 
transformative constitutional amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court 
said, in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital78 that “[in] view of the great—
not to say revolutionary—changes which have taken place . . . in the 
contractual, political, and civil status of women, culminating in the 
                                                                                                             
 77 Id. 
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Nineteenth Amendment, it is not unreasonable to say that these dif-
ferences have now come almost, if not quite, to the vanishing 
point.”79 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes dissented in this case, ar-
guing that our country “will need more than the Nineteenth Amend-
ment to convince [him] that there are no differences between men 
and women, or that legislation cannot take those differences into ac-
count.”80  This is the same Justice Holmes who, in the eugenics case 
of Buck v. Bell, said that: 
We have seen more than once that the public welfare 
may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It 
would be strange if it could not call upon those who 
already sap the strength of the State for these lesser 
sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those con-
cerned, to prevent our being swamped with incom-
petence. It is better for all the world, if instead of 
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or 
to let them starve for their imbecility, society can pre-
vent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing 
their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory 
vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fal-
lopian tubes. . . . Three generations of imbeciles is 
enough.81 
In 1937, the New Deal Supreme Court overruled Adkins v. Chil-
dren’s Hospital in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, a case which, in 
effect, held that gender classifications are reviewed under rational 
basis scrutiny and not the skeptical scrutiny used in Adkins v. Chil-
dren’s Hospital, which had been decided shortly after the Nine-
teenth Amendment was ratified and which reflected the national 
mood at that time.82 The New Deal Supreme Court then announced 
(in a footnote to a case upholding an economic classification as to 
filled milk) that it would give rational basis scrutiny to all state so-
cial and economic legislation unless it: 1) intruded on rights secured 
by the federal Bill of Rights against the federal government; 2) 
                                                                                                             
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 579–60 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 81 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 
197 U.S. 11 (1905)). 
 82 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1936). 
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closed off the political processes of change; or 3) discriminated 
against a discrete and insular minority.83 Since women were not a 
discrete and insular minority in 1938 and nor are they now, Carolene 
Products made clear at the time that sex discrimination would be 
upheld if there was a rational basis for it. 
In Goesaert v. Cleary, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote for a six-
justice majority of New Dealers, upholding as constitutional a Mich-
igan law, which forbade women from being bartenders unless they 
were the wives or daughters of a bartender.84 Justice Frankfurter up-
held this law using rational basis scrutiny, which was all the scrutiny 
that he thought was called for.85 
In 1964, the Congress of the United States disagreed with Justice 
Frankfurter and forbade sex discrimination in employment in its 
landmark civil rights bill enacted later that year.86 This evidently 
made an impression on the Supreme Court, which in a unanimous 
opinion by Chief Justice Warren Burger in Reed v. Reed, ruled that 
sex discrimination in a state inheritance law violated the rational ba-
sis test.87 The Justices came close to giving sex classifications strict 
scrutiny in Frontiero v. Richardson,88 but they settled for something 
called middle level scrutiny instead in Craig v. Boren.89 
Throughout this period of time, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Wil-
liam H. Rehnquist campaigned tirelessly for a rule of strict scrutiny 
for racial classifications and rational basis scrutiny of everything 
else.90 Justice Rehnquist used the New Deal Supreme Court decision 
in Carolene Products—the filled milk case—as his lodestar. Justice 
Rehnquist also notably cited to Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,91 a 
radical rational basis test opinion, in his dissent in Roe v. Wade.92 
Justice Rehnquist’s embrace of New Deal constitutionalism did not 
have anything to do with the original meaning of the Fourteenth or 
Nineteenth Amendments. He did not in fact care about originalism 
                                                                                                             
 83 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 84 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). 
 85 Id. at 466–67. 
 86 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
 87 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
 88 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
 89 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 90 See Davis, supra note 4, at 293, 297. See also Rehnquist, supra note 4. 
 91 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
 92 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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or constitutionally limited government at all.93 Justice Rehnquist ar-
gued for the rational basis test because he thought the Supreme 
Court was behaving in a judicially restrained manner when it upheld 
laws as being constitutional.94 It should be mentioned in this regard 
that Justice Rehnquist, as a law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Rob-
ert Jackson, wrote a memo arguing against Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation and in favor of Plessy v. Ferguson on judicial restraint 
grounds.95 After all, in Plessy, no State law was struck down so the 
Court was arguably judicially restrained.96 Justice Rehnquist did say 
at his confirmation hearings that he had been asked by Justice Jack-
son to lay out the legal case for the losing side in Brown and that the 
views in his memo to his boss were not his own.97 
In United States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court revisited the law 
of sex discrimination and held that sex discriminatory laws must 
have an “exceedingly persuasive justification” that survives “skep-
tical scrutiny.”98 This brought the Supreme Court back to the view 
it expressed in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, where the Court had 
said that after the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment differ-
ences in legal rights between men and women were practically at the 
“vanishing point.”99 Professor Calabresi has defended this conclu-
sion in a law review article with Julia Rickert entitled: Originalism 
and Sex Discrimination.100 We honestly and sincerely believe that 
sex discrimination violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s equality 
guarantee, and that our view is more faithful to the original meaning 
of that document than is Justice Rehnquist’s test of strict scrutiny 
for race and rational basis review for everything else. The Rehnquist 
                                                                                                             
 93 Davis, supra note 4, at 294–95. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist to Justice Robert H. Jackson, A 
Random Thought on the Segregation Cases (circa December 1952) (on file as part 
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view reads the word “race” into the text of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment when it is not there, even though the exact same word appears 
in the Fifteenth Amendment. 
Tellingly, an early draft of the Fourteenth Amendment originally 
did limit the scope of the Amendment to race and race-based dis-
crimination. Later, these draft versions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment were scraped in favor of a broader phrasing that included guar-
antees for the rights of all persons, regardless of race. One original 
draft version of the Fourteenth Amendment read: 
Sec, 1. No discrimination shall be made by any state, 
nor by the United States, as to the civil rights of per-
sons because of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude. 
Sec. 2. From and after the fourth day of July, in the 
year one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six, no 
discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the 
United States, as to the enjoyment by classes of per-
sons of the right of suffrage, because of race, color, 
or previous condition of servitude. 
Sec. 3. Until the fourth day of July, one thousand 
eight hundred and seventy-six, no class of persons, 
as to the right of any of whom to suffrage discrimi-
nation shall be made by any state, because of race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude, shall be in-
cluded in the basis of representation.101 
Ultimately, the ratified version of the Fourteenth Amendment 
did not contain such race-based limitations.102 Largely, this is be-
cause the original draft version of the Amendment was rejected by 
members of Congress on both the right and the left, since both par-
ties wanted the Fourteenth Amendment to protect against a wider 
array of rights violations. Congress members on the left “wanted to 
prohibit all forms of caste” and members on the right “wanted to 
                                                                                                             
 101 BENJ. B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN 
ON RECONSTRUCTION 83–84 (Columbia Univ. 1914). 
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protect the rights of white Unionists in the South.”103 In this sense, 
the Fourteenth Amendment was certainly intended to protect the 
rights of more than just black Americans. 
Indeed, as the final version of Section One of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was introduced in Congress on May 23, 1866, Senator 
Howard explained that the words race and color were dropped from 
the Fourteenth Amendment because: 
The last two clauses of the first section of the amend-
ment disable a State from depriving not merely a cit-
izen of the United States, but any person, whoever he 
may be, of life, liberty, or property without due pro-
cess of law, or from denying to him the equal protec-
tion of the laws of the State. This abolishes all class 
legislation in the States and does away with the in-
justice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code 
not applicable to another.104 
On an earlier date, Senator Eliot explained the meaning of Sec-
tion One of the Fourteenth Amendment using similar justifications: 
I support the first section because the doctrine it de-
clares is right, and if, under the Constitution as it now 
stands, Congress has not the power to prohibit[] State 
legislation discriminating against classes of citizens 
or depriving any persons of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law, or denying to any per-
sons within the State the equal protection of the laws, 
then, in my judgment, such power should be dis-
tinctly conferred.105 
This understanding of Section One as banning all caste- and 
class-based legislation was discussed at length in Congress,106 but it 
                                                                                                             
 103 See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 17, at 32. 
 104 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866). 
 105 Id. at 2511. 
 106 Melissa Saunders quotes Representative Hotchkiss of New York as saying 
that the Fourteenth Amendment was “designed to forbid a state to ‘discriminate 
between its citizens and give one class of citizens greater rights than it confers 
upon another.’” Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and 
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was not contested.107 On the other hand, suggestions that Section 
One only protected black people were explicitly rejected.108 Indeed, 
those who opposed the Amendment did not dispute the idea that it 
prohibited caste- and class-based legislation. Instead, they expressed 
views that were unabashedly in favor of class legislation.109 In this 
                                                                                                             
Howard as saying that the Equal Protection Clause of the Amendment would 
“abolish[] all class legislation in the States and do[] away with the injustice of 
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 107 Senator Dixon, debating the content of Section One, stated: 
   One word in reply to the Senator from Massachusetts, with the consent of 
the Senate. The Senator says that I have forgotten many things, and among 
others the guarantees required by the four million slaves who have been 
emancipated. I desire to ask the Senator what guarantee those persons have 
in the proposition reported by the committee. The Senator exhausted all the 
terms of opprobrium in the English language in denouncing a resolution 
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CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2335. 
 108 Senator Bingham, during the congressional debate, clarified that Section 
One applied to whites as well as blacks: 
Mr. HALE. It is claimed that this constitutional amendment is aimed simply and 
purely toward the protection of “American citizens of African descent” in the 
States lately in rebellion. I understand that to be the whole intended practical ef-
fect of the amendment. 
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well to protect the thousands and tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands of 
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been wrested from them under confiscation, and protect them also against banish-
ment. 
Id. at 1065. 
 
 109 A statement made by Representative Nicholson during congressional de-
bates exemplifies sentiment favorable to class legislation: 
Now, the negro race in this country constitute such a class which is easily and 
well defined; and the peace and welfare of a State, especially where they are found 
in great numbers, demand that the radical difference between them and the white 
race should be recognized by legislation; and every State should be allowed to 
remain free and independent in providing punishments for crime, and otherwise 
regulating their internal affairs, so that they might properly discriminate between 
them, as their peace and safety might require. 
Id. at 2081. 
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sense, it is clear that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment in-
tended for the Amendment to ban caste- and class-based legislation. 
Around this time, Senator Charles Sumner helped to popularize 
the view that the Fourteenth Amendment ought to bar the creation 
of caste systems across the board, and his view was widely sup-
ported by other Senators, as illuminated by a discussion between 
Senators Howard and Clark.110 Indeed, Senator Charles Sumner ar-
gued that the voting-rights provision of the Fourteenth Amendment 
represented a national “recognition of a caste and the disenfran-
chisement of a race.”111 Senator Jacob Howard agreed, contending 
that the Fourteenth Amendment must apply “not to color or to race 
at all, but simply to the fact of individual exclusion” from crucial 
political and civil rights.112 
In the end, this view became so widespread that even the Repub-
lican National Party posted bulletins explaining that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was meant to bar caste- and class-based discrimina-
tion.113 Published in August of 1866, the bulletin read: 
The Republicans in Congress sought by legislation 
and by constitutional amendment to guarantee to 
every citizen of the republic the equality of civil 
rights before the law. How much did the Democrats 
do toward that object? 
The Republicans in Congress sought to break up the 
foundations of secession and rebellion by making cit-
izenship national and not sectional. How much did 
the Democrats do toward that object? 
The Republicans in Congress tried to the extent of 
their powers to abolish throughout the bounds of the 
republic the evils of caste, as second only to those of 
slavery. How much did the Democrats do toward that 
object?114 
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Undeniably, then, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
gave state legislators ample notice that they understood the Amend-
ment to prohibit caste of systems of special-interest and class-based 
lawmaking. This view was articulated clearly and was readily avail-
able to all who sought clarification about the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and its meaning. 
At the same time, the legislative history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment reveals that opposition to the Black Codes was “not be-
cause they discriminated on the basis of race,” but rather “because 
they singled out a certain class of individuals for unique disad-
vantage.”115 For example, Senator Lyman Trumbull—the co-spon-
sor of the Civil Rights Act of 1866—disliked the Black Codes be-
cause they “deprive[d] [some] citizen[s] of civil rights which are se-
cured to other citizens,” thereby violating Blackstone’s maxim that 
“the restraints introduced by the law should be equal to all.”116 In a 
similar line of argument, Senator William Pitt Fessenden described 
the Black Codes as being an unacceptable form of class legisla-
tion.117 Many others noted that the Black Codes had the effect of 
reducing freed black men to the position of being second-class citi-
zens.118 At the same time, President Andrew Johnson opposed the 
Black Codes because, “there is no room for favored classes or mo-
nopolies,” since the most basic “principle of our Government is that 
of equal laws,” which must always “accord[] ‘equal and exact jus-
tice to all men,’ [and] special privileges to none.”119 
This is relevant given the fact that some scholars who object to 
our interpretation of the original public meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment contend that it was merely—or at least primarily—
passed as a means of undermining the Black Codes.120 Insofar as the 
predominate objections to the Black Codes were objections to caste- 
and class-based legislation, it seems unlikely that the Fourteenth 
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Amendment was understood solely as banning discrimination of a 
racial nature. Coupled together, the fact that most Senators opposed 
to the Black Codes were appalled by its status as a piece of class 
legislation and the fact that the final draft of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was “carefully drafted” to make “no specific mention of race” 
means that the Fourteenth Amendment ought to be understood as 
“banning all systems of class and caste, and not just discrimination 
on the basis of race.”121 
Furthermore, this view is supported by the writings of former 
Justice Scalia, a well-known originalist who emphasized the im-
portance of the original meaning of the constitution and of constitu-
tional amendments.122 In his dissenting opinion in Rutan v. Repub-
lican Party of Illinois,123 former Justice Scalia “gave a glimpse into 
his view of the Equal Protection Clause.”124 He wrote that “the Thir-
teenth Amendment’s abolition of the institution of black slavery[] 
leaves no room for doubt that laws treating people differently be-
cause of their race are invalid.”125 In this sense, former Justice Scalia 
correctly seemed to suppose that the Thirteenth Amendment banned 
more than just black slavery, which it does because it bans slavery 
altogether (just as the Fourteenth Amendment bans caste alto-
gether), and those two Amendments do not just ban African Ameri-
can slavery or discrimination against only African Americans. The 
Fourteenth Amendment protects all persons and “was meant to ap-
ply broadly.”126 
It is important to be clear that this view of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was shared not only by the Framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but also by the individuals who completed its ratifica-
tion. Professor Calabresi has argued elsewhere that “[t]he Framers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and those who contemplated its rati-
fication said repeatedly and publicly that it forbids the imposition of 
caste systems and caste-based lawmaking,” and “[t]hose who heard 
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[that] concurred in that understanding.”127 Indeed, “the Amend-
ment’s Framers and contemporary commentators frequently com-
pared race discrimination to other forms of arbitrary, caste-creating 
forms of discrimination,” like the imposition of a European feudal 
system or an Indian caste system, “to explain what the Amendment 
would prohibit.”128 
The original public meaning of the Amendment is thus that it 
bars all systems of caste- and class-based laws. For example, as the 
Fourteenth Amendment was being considered in Congress, some 
members of the public began demanding a constitutional amend-
ment that would end “all forms of class legislation whatsoever for 
good.”129 The Chicago Tribune published an editorial in January of 
1866 representing one such appeal.130 The editorial argues that the 
Black Codes create a class-based system resembling European aris-
tocracy, and ought to be banned on the basis that they allow for op-
pression by creating a hereditary ruling class: 
We have seen, through bitter experience, the evils of 
class legislation as practi[c]ed by the States, in the 
form of slave and black codes. We cannot but per-
ceive the evils of the system in England, and all mo-
narchical governments, where the laws are allowed 
to recognize distinctions between persons and clas-
ses. We cannot shut our eyes to the patent fact that 
such legislation, even when exercised for good pur-
poses, is based upon a principle of pernicious tenden-
cies, that ought not, if it can be avoided, to obtain a 
recognition in the Republic. The design and spirit of 
our Government is opposed to this system, and its 
evident intent is to render unnecessary any special 
enactments for the benefit or repression of any class, 
but to legislate for all alike. But, unhappily, there is, 
at present, no special clause whereby this intent can 
be accomplished, in cases like that under considera-
tion. And, if the several States can practi[c]e class 
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legislation, as between whites and blacks, except 
when forbidden by counter-legislation by Congress, 
they can also create class distinctions in the future 
between native and adopted citizens, between rich 
and poor, or between any other divisions of society. 
The most effectual way to reach the root of this mat-
ter, is to amend the Constitution so as to forbid class 
legislation entirely by prohibiting the enactment of 
laws creating or recognizing any political distinc-
tions because of class, race or color between the in-
habitants of any State or Territory, and providing that 
all classes shall possess the same civil rights and im-
munities, and be liable to the same penalties, and giv-
ing Congress the power to carry the clause into ef-
fect . . . .[W]e believe that we might as well level the 
evil of caste at one blow, as to fight it by driblets and 
sections, through another long course of years.131 
The Tribune’s desire to create a constitutional amendment pro-
hibiting caste-discrimination was “not echoed by all,” but even those 
who opposed the Amendment recognized that eliminating caste-dis-
crimination was a major component of Section One of the Four-
teenth Amendment.132 Indeed, one such commentator wrote in the 
Daily National Intelligencer in January 1866, expressing fear that 
Congress would overstep the boundaries of abolishing slavery and 
“repeal God’s law of caste.”133 Additionally, the Philadelphia North 
American Gazette published in February 1866 that a constitutional 
amendment was under discussion in Congress that would “secure 
for the citizens of any one State the same rights as are enjoyed by 
the citizens of other States, thus terminating the discriminations 
made against sections and classes and races.”134 This view of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, then, seems quite widespread. 
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Indeed, “[p]opular accounts of the Fourteenth Amendment un-
derstood it to be far-reaching,” banning caste- and class-based leg-
islation on the whole.135 The San Francisco Daily Evening Bulletin 
characterized the Fourteenth Amendment as “an opportunity . . . for 
the masses to break down the domination of caste and aristoc-
racy.”136 The Boston Daily Advertiser described the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s purpose as “compel[ling] the states to . . . throw the 
same shield over the black man as over the white, over the humble 
as over the powerful.”137 In the same vein, the Cincinnati Commer-
cial penned that the Amendment gave the Constitution a dose of “the 
great Democratic principle of equality before the law” and thereby 
invalidated any and all “legislation hostile to any one class.”138 In 
this sense, newspaper articles dispensed at the time of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s ratification seemed to uniformly agree that the 
Amendment would bar caste- and class-based discrimination in the 
United States. 
At the same time, there is widespread academic agreement—
even amongst peers that disagree with our understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment—that the Fourteenth Amendment constitu-
tionalized the Civil Rights Act of 1866.139 This is important, because 
newspaper editorials published while the Civil Rights Act was being 
considered in Congress uniformly agreed that the Act “conferr[ed] 
the same common law civil rights on all citizens without regard to 
race,” while also establishing that the Civil Rights Act barred caste- 
and class-based legislation.140 Indeed, “[t]he earliest press coverage 
of the Civil Rights Bill . . . show that the public debate over the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 began with a full realization of the fact that the 
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law was an equalizing measure that sought the exact same rights for 
all citizens of the United States.”141 For example, the North Ameri-
can and United States Gazette wrote on February 12, 1866, that: 
The Civil Rights bill, to which we alluded on its pas-
sage by the Senate, is properly connected with this 
Freedmen’s Bureau bill, and taken together they will 
undoubtedly work great changes in the rebellious 
States. They must render nugatory all efforts of the 
dominant rebel influence to re-impose a pernicious 
system of caste upon the south and to deprive the 
freedmen of their civil rights, or of the legal means 
of defence.142 
In this sense, newspapers regarded the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
as a rejection of “the South’s effort to re-impose a caste system.”143 
This view of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was also defended by the 
Boston Daily Journal on February 23, 1866. Therein, it was argued 
that “there is no substantive disagreement among loyal men respect-
ing [African American] civil rights. We all agree that they must have 
the civil rights of any other class of citizens, the rights of person and 
property, to sue and to be sued – in short equality before the laws.”144 
The Philadelphia Inquirer printed the same article—on the same 
day—stating that “we all agree that [African Americans] must have 
the civil rights of all other class of citizens.”145 Here, we see general 
agreement that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 barred caste- and class-
based legislation. Given the fact that scholars see the Fourteenth 
Amendment as constitutionalizing the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
such scholars must also admit that the Fourteenth Amendment bars 
the creation or enforcement of caste- and class-based legislation. 
Historical newspaper accounts indisputably support this interpreta-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, and of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866. 
                                                                                                             
 141 Id. at 1437–38. 
 142 The Practical Work of Reconstruction, N. AM. & U.S. GAZETTE, Feb. 12, 
1866, at 2. 
 143 See Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 21, at 1442. 
 144 The Country in No Peril, BOS. DAILY J., Feb. 23, 1866, at 4. 
 145 Views of David Dudley Field, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 23, 1866, at 8. 
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Furthermore, following the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court doled out several decisions that 
clearly “understood that the Fourteenth Amendment had constitu-
tionalized the antebellum doctrine against special or partial laws.”146 
In the Slaugher-House Cases, the Court “dealt with a classic piece 
of antebellum class legislation: a monopoly.”147 Justice Bradley’s 
dissenting opinion “dutifully identified the state-granted slaughter-
house monopoly as class legislation and declared it unconstitutional 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s equality guarantee.”148 Specifi-
cally, Justice Bradley contended that “a law which prohibits a large 
class of citizens from adopting a lawful employment . . . deprives 
those citizens of the equal protection of the laws . . . .”149 Eleven 
years later, in a follow-up case, Justice Bradley argued that the Four-
teenth Amendment represents a “denial of the equal protection of 
the laws to grant to one man, or set of men, the privilege of following 
an ordinary calling in a large community, and to deny it to all oth-
ers . . . .”150 In this sense, Justice Bradley has concurred with our 
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment since the Slaughter-
House Cases. 
The Supreme Court upheld this view of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment again in 1885 in Barbier v. Connolly.151 Therein, Justice Field 
explained that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits “[c]lass legisla-
tion, discriminating against some and favoring others.”152 Crucially, 
the “purpose of the law cannot be to grant a special benefit to a par-
ticular individual or group” or to strip an individual or group of some 
particular benefits.153 Instead, the purpose “must be to promote an 
important public” aim or goal.154 As a result, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment only allows for the existence of laws that discriminate when 
                                                                                                             
 146 See Calabresi & Salander, supra note 15, at 957. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 122 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 150 Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent 
City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 766 (1884) 
(Bradley, J., concurring). 
 151 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31–32 (1885). 
 152 Id. at 32. 
 153 See Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 63, at 1031. 
 154 Id. 
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those laws “are designed, not to impose unequal or unnecessary re-
strictions upon any one, but to promote, with as little individual in-
convenience as possible, the general good.”155 This view is also ex-
pressed in Corfield v. Coryell, where Justice Washington indicated 
that “fundamental rights could [only] be trumped by just laws en-
acted for the good of the whole people.”156 
Further, in Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, the Supreme Court 
used the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down a state law that 
“awarded attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs injured by trains because the 
law subjected railroad companies to a peculiar burden not placed on 
other corporations or individuals.”157 In the majority opinion, the 
Court rationalized that allowing state governments to subject “cer-
tain individuals or corporations to hostile and discriminating legis-
lation is to make the protecting clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment a mere rope of sand, in no matter restraining state action.”158 
The Court “took it for granted that the Fourteenth Amendment 
banned all forms of class legislation and actually cited antebellum 
state cases to explain its Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.”159 
On this point, “the court was unanimous.”160 
At the same time, the Civil Rights Cases also represent an in-
stance of the Supreme Court unanimously agreeing that the Four-
teenth Amendment bars caste- and class-based forms of discrimina-
tion. In the majority opinion, Justice Bradley contended that “class 
legislation” is “obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”161 Justice Bradley defined class legislation as any law 
that “den[ies] to any person, or class of persons, the right to pursue 
any peaceful avocations allowed to others.”162 In the dissent, Justice 
Harlan wrote: 
If the constitutional amendments be enforced, ac-
cording to the intent with which, as I conceive, they 
                                                                                                             
 155 Barbier, 113 U.S. at 31–32. 
 156 See Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 63, at 1031 (citing Corfield v. 
Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (1823)). 
 157 See Calabresi & Salander, supra note 15, at 958. 
 158 Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154 (1897). 
 159 See Calabresi & Salander, supra note 15, at 958. 
 160 Id at 959. 
 161 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883). 
 162 Id. at 23–24. 
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were adopted, there cannot be, in this republic, any 
class of humans being in practical subjection to an-
other class, with power in the latter to dole out to the 
former just such privileges as they may choose to 
grant.163 
Further, Skinner v. Oklahoma stands out as another Supreme 
Court case defending our view of the Fourteenth Amendment as 
banning caste- and class-based legislation. Indeed, Skinner v. Okla-
homa “stands as a nineteenth century class legislation case where a 
fundamental liberty – the right to procreate – was being denied to 
low class thieves but not to high class thieves.”164 In this case, “the 
law in question discriminated among different classes of thieves, but 
it did not do so to promote the general interest but did so instead to 
support the interests of high class thieves.”165 In the end, the court 
held that the law was unconstitutional, at least in part, on the grounds 
that it violated the low class thieves’ right to equality under the 
law.166 In this sense, Skinner provides additional support for our ar-
gument that caste- and class-based legislation is prohibited by the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Put together, all of these Supreme Court and lower court cases 
provide further support for our contention that American constitu-
tional law upholds our interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Indeed, this view of the Fourteenth Amendment has continued 
into the modern day. The Supreme Court continues to base their 
opinions on the understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment bars 
caste- and class-based legislation. Indeed, “much of the Supreme 
Court’s use of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down various 
impermissible classifications in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s is also 
quite consistent with our view that the Fourteenth Amendment en-
acts a general ban on class legislation and systems of caste.”167 Laws 
                                                                                                             
 163 Id. at 62 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 164 See Calabresi & Salander, supra note 15, at 998 (citing Skinner v. Okla-
homa ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 537–41 (1942)). 
 165 Id. 
 166 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541–43. 
 167 See Calabresi & Salander, supra note 15, at 1002. 
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that discriminate on the basis of national origin, gender,168 illegiti-
macy,169 and physical disability170 “constitut[e] a caste system be-
cause these groups are defined in part by heredity or by immutable 
characteristics.”171 Sexual orientation is another immutable charac-
teristic.172 As a result, laws that ban same-sex marriage thrust 
LGBTQ couples into a state of second-class citizenship, thereby un-
dermining their Fourteenth Amendment right to be treated equally 
under the law. 
In this sense, the Supreme Court has continuously—throughout 
American history—upheld the view that the Fourteenth Amendment 
bars caste- and class-based legislation, especially insofar as those 
laws explicitly or facially target certain groups.173 Given the fact that 
laws banning same-sex marriage do explicitly single out LGBTQ 
individuals, and strip them of a privilege granted to heterosexual 
couples, this represents a fundamental violation of their right to 
equality, thereby violating the Fourteenth Amendment. Supreme 
Court precedent supports such a view. In the end, then, relevant case 
law upholds our interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as en-
acting a general ban on caste- and class-based legislation. 
However, “we recognize that interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment to include a broad ban on all class legislation is to adopt 
an approach to the Amendment’s anti-discrimination clause that is 
                                                                                                             
 168 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 
U.S. 677, 690–91 (1973). See also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 554–
57 (1996). 
 169 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 
535, 537–38 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175–76 
(1972). 
 170 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448, 450 
(1985) (holding that denial of zoning permit to home for mentally retarded indi-
viduals failed rational basis test under the Equal Protection Clause). But see id. at 
473 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment in part) (ar-
guing that mentally retarded individuals should be considered a suspect class due 
to history of discrimination and strict scrutiny analysis should apply). 
 171 See Calabresi & Salander, supra note 15, at 1002. 
 172 Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 320–26 (D. Conn. 
2012). 
 173 See Calabresi & Salander, supra note 15, at 1002. See also Craig, 429 U.S. 
at 210; Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690–91; Virginia, 518 U.S. at 554–57; Trimble, 430 
U.S. at 7776 ; Gomez, 409 U.S. at 537–38 ; Weber, 406 U.S. at 175–76 ; City of 
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448, 450. 
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inconsistent with the legendary discussion in Carolene Products 
Footnote Four.”174 Within that footnote, “the Supreme court indi-
cated that the Fourteenth Amendment’s anti-discrimination com-
mand”175 only protects “discrete and insular minorities.”176 This 
“implies a narrow reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, under 
which the Amendment’s anti-discrimination command would not 
apply to women or other majority victims of class legislation.”177 
Notably, however, “the Supreme Court has rejected” this approach 
in recent years,178 and “the Court has decided many recent Four-
teenth Amendment cases without even citing the Carolene Prod-
ucts”179 discrete and insular minorities test.180 In this sense, recent 
precedent shows the Supreme Court moving away from this limited 
view of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
At the same time, there is no reason to think that the decision in 
Carolene Products is inconsistent with the view that the Fourteenth 
Amendment acts as a general ban against class legislation and sys-
tems of caste. Professor Calabresi articulated this argument well in 
an earlier article, wherein he argued that: 
[T]he holding in Carolene Products is consistent 
with the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment bans 
class legislation generally. In Carolene Products, 
Congress prohibited shipments of a certain kind of 
imitation milk which it found could be “injurious to 
the public health, and its sale constitutes a fraud on 
                                                                                                             
 174 See Calabresi & Salander, supra note 15, at 1004. 
 175 Id. 
 176 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938). 
 177 See Calabresi & Salander, supra note 15, at 1004. 
 178 See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 592–93 (2009) (striking down 
discrimination against whites); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720, 747 (2007) (applying strict scrutiny to an affirm-
ative action program and striking down the program); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
244, 275 (2003) (limiting an affirmative action program); Regents of Univ. of Cal. 
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (striking down an affirmative action pro-
gram). 
 179 See Calabresi & Salander, supra note 15, at 1004. 
 180 See, e.g., Ricci, 557 U.S. at 593; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 
(1995); Trimble, 430 U.S. at 776; Craig, 29 U.S. at 208–09; Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677, 690–91 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971). 
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the public.” The law thus singled out sellers of imi-
tation milk for a special burden, but it did so under a 
public purpose justification—public health concerns 
and protecting the public from fraud. Those are suf-
ficient justifications for upholding the law; the Su-
preme Court was right in the Carolene Products case 
itself.181 
In this vein, it seems that relevant Supreme Court precedent up-
holds our interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as instituting 
a general ban on class legislation and systems of caste in the United 
States. 
Moreover, there is reason to believe that even if the Court was 
forced to apply the discrete and insular minorities test from Footnote 
Four of the Carolene Products decision, the Justices would still con-
clude that laws disproportionately targeting LGBTQ individuals 
ought to count as unconstitutional under “more exacting judicial 
scrutiny.”182 When determining whether or not a minority group 
counts as discrete and insular, one must assess whether or not the 
minority group is politically powerless or otherwise lacking in po-
litical power.183 According to a judge on the Northern District Court 
of California, LGBTQ people “are a minority of the population in 
the United States” and represent a discrete and insular minority be-
cause “despite the modest successes in remediating existing discrim-
ination, the record demonstrates that gay men and lesbians continue 
to suffer discrimination” that is “unlikely to be rectified by legisla-
tive means.”184 As such, the Court found “that the unequivocal evi-
dence demonstrates that, although not completely politically power-
less, the gay and lesbian community lacks meaningful political 
power.”185 As such, even if the Court were forced to utilize the dis-
crete and insular minorities test, laws enacting bans on same-sex 
marriage would still count as unconstitutional because they dispro-
                                                                                                             
 181 See Calabresi & Salander, supra note 15, at 1004–05 (internal citations 
omitted). 
 182 Id. at 1005. See also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 183 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 184 Karen Golinski v. U.S. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 988–89 
(N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 185 Id. at 989. 
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portionately discriminate against gays and lesbians, a group of peo-
ple that seems to clearly represent a discrete and insular minority in 
the United States. Thus, Supreme Court precedent backs our inter-
pretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as barring caste- and class-
based legislation. 
In addition to Supreme Court precedent, “opposition to class leg-
islation and the need for generality in lawmaking were expressed in 
state court decisions throughout the country in the period from the 
1820s to the 1860s.”186 In 1824, the Maine Supreme Court stated, 
“it can never be within the bounds of legitimate legislation to enact 
a special law . . . granting a privilege and indulgence to one man” 
that is not granted “to all other persons.”187 Rather, laws ought to be 
“prescribed for the benefit and regulation of the whole community,” 
given the fact that each and every individual has “an equal right” to 
his or her “protection” under the law.188 In the same vein, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court argued in 1851 that “general laws are en-
acted, which bear . . . on the whole community,” and “if they are 
unjust and against the spirit of the constitution, the whole commu-
nity will be interested to procure their repeal.”189 In this sense, state 
courts have also upheld the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment 
bars caste- and class-based legislation. 
Similarly, the Tennessee Supreme Court also embraced this in-
terpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment within its own state con-
stitution. In 1844, the Tennessee Supreme Court “ruled that a law 
that allowed trustees of a particular trust to receive a donation made 
to an unincorporated association was void because of the constitu-
tional requirement that legislators may not suspend a general law for 
the benefit of particular individuals.”190 Its constitution said that: 
the legislature shall have no power to pass any law, 
for the benefit of individuals, inconsistent with the 
general laws of the land, nor to pass any law granting 
                                                                                                             
 186 See Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 63, at 1031. 
 187 See Saunders, supra note 106, at 253 n.34 (discussing the protection of 
equal rights for all groups of citizens) (quoting Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326, 335–
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to any individuals rights, privileges, immunities, or 
exemptions other than such as may be by the same 
law extended to any member of the community who 
may be able to bring himself within the provisions of 
this law.191 
This case, based on the underlying tenets of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, upholds the idea that laws ought not to target certain 
groups and strip them of privileges and benefits doled out to the rest 
of society. In this sense, the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the 
view of the Fourteenth Amendment espoused within this piece. 
Likewise, in an 1859 Ohio Supreme Court case, the dissent ar-
gued against a law that established “separate schools for colored 
children.”192 On the subject of caste-based legislation, the dissent 
argued that it is: 
[T]he inveterate vice of absolute governments, and is 
inconsistent with the theory and spirit of a free and 
popular government like ours; asserting in its bill of 
rights the equality of all men. A free government like 
ours must be presumed, so far as practicable, to avoid 
class legislation; and rather to trust and favor the nat-
ural liberty and right of individuals to form and reg-
ulate their own social circles and classification ac-
cording to their respective predilections and preju-
dices.193 
Ultimately, the judge concluded that “it seems to me alike un-
wise and wholly out of character with the progress, the general in-
telligence, and liberality of the age at this time—more than ten years 
after the repeal of the ‘black laws,’ . . . to give an extent and effect 
to those disabling statutes.”194 Here, we see another example of 
judges at the state level upholding the concept that the laws ought to 
apply fairly to everyone and that they ought not strip certain groups 
of benefits that the rest of the community enjoys. In the end then, 
                                                                                                             
 191 Id.; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 7. 
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this view of the Fourteenth Amendment was widespread at the time 
of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, at both the state and 
national levels. 
Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment not only guarantees all “per-
sons” the equal protection of the laws, but it also guarantees all “per-
sons” due process of the law. No one thinks that the word “person” 
in the Due Process Clause applies only to racial minorities and not 
to women, as well as to white men, so why would not the very same 
word—”person”—mean the same thing in the Equal Protection con-
text? Nor would those of us who would resurrect the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment think that women, 
as well as men, are not citizens of the United States.195 
Once we examine the original meaning of the Fourteenth and 
Nineteenth Amendments in relation to each other, then we are led 
ineluctably to the conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment bans 
not only the Black Codes, but also other similar systems of caste- or 
class-based legislation. When the Nineteenth Amendment was rati-
fied in 1920, any logical synthesis of these two Amendments re-
quired that laws that discriminate on the basis of sex be seen as gen-
erally forbidden. The arc of American history has egalitarian roots 
that go back to seventeenth century England and New England, and 
the U.S. concern with improving its record as to equality has had a 
global reach. 
II. SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
The Supreme Court was right to hold in Loving v. Virginia that 
laws against interracial marriage violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Professor Calabresi has made this argument previously in a 
law review article co-authored with Andrea Matthews, the article 
entitled Originalism and Loving v. Virginia.196 If a white person has 
a right to marry another white person, then under the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment, citizens of every race 
and color have the same right. Laws that allow white people only to 
marry white people and African Americans only to marry African 
                                                                                                             
 195 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 196 See Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 21, at 1394 (arguing that Loving 
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Americans discriminate on the basis of race by telling an individual 
of one race that he cannot marry an individual of another race.197 
This is, as a formal matter, race discrimination if we look at it—as 
we must—through the lens of an individual picking a spouse to 
marry. 
State laws that ban same-sex marriage formally discriminate on 
the basis of sex in the same way that State laws that banned interra-
cial marriage discriminated on the basis of race. Same-sex marriage 
laws allow a man to marry a woman, but not another man. This is, 
again as a formal matter, sex discrimination—plain and simple. 
This argument was first made by Professor Andrew Koppelman 
in the New York University Law Review.198 According to Professor 
Koppelman, the sex discrimination argument garnered new weight 
and was popularized following the Hawaiian Supreme Court deci-
sion in Baehr v. Lewin.199 This case—decided in May of 1993—held 
that “a law restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples came within 
the scope of the prohibition on sex discrimination in the equal pro-
tection clause of the state constitution.”200 In other words, the Ha-
waiian Supreme Court was the first court to hold that prohibitions 
on same-sex marriage constitute a form of sex discrimination, be-
cause the laws bar an individual from marrying his or her partner on 
the basis of sex alone. 
Professor Koppelman contends that “as a matter of definition, if 
the same conduct is prohibited or stigmatized when engaged in by a 
person of one sex, while it is tolerated when engaged in by a person 
of the other sex, then the party imposing the prohibition or stigma is 
discriminating on the basis of sex.”201 In other words, “if Lucy is 
permitted to marry Fred, but Ricky may not marry Fred, then (as-
suming that Fred would be a desirable spouse for either) Ricky is 
                                                                                                             
 197 Id. at 1404. 
 198 Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men 
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being discriminated against because of his sex.”202 In this sense, it 
seems virtually incontrovertible that bans on same-sex marriage do 
not constitute a form of sex discrimination. 
Sex discrimination is only permitted under United States v. Vir-
ginia or Adkins v. Children’s Hospital if the State can proffer an 
“exceedingly persuasive justification” for the discrimination in 
question, which must survive “skeptical scrutiny.”203 Given the his-
toric roots of our national commitment to birth equality discussed in 
this article, State laws which ban same-sex marriage cannot meet 
this burden. In other words, the originalist justifications for protect-
ing a right to same-sex marriage discussed above—namely, that an-
ything less is a form of class or caste-based discrimination—weak-
ens these arguments because they cannot overcome skeptical scru-
tiny in the face of such consistent historical opposition. In saying 
this, Professor Calabresi is not going to criticize the motives or the 
rationality of his many friends who are opposed in good faith to 
same-sex marriage or to a constitutional right to same-sex marriage. 
He understands and appreciates the arguments that some opponents 
of same-sex marriage have made, such as those made in the article, 
What is Marriage? authored by Sherif Girgis, Robert George, and 
Ryan Anderson.204 
We approach this question after deeply studying the history of 
this country, the Declaration of Independence, the first state bill of 
rights, the Articles of Confederation, the U.S. Constitution of 1787, 
and, critically, the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. Profes-
sor Calabresi has had many friends, some of whom are deeply op-
posed to same-sex marriage and others of whom are gay and are 
married. Suffice it to say that we have yet to hear an exceedingly 
persuasive argument which will survive skeptical scrutiny as to why 
same-sex marriage is more threatening to heterosexual marriage 
                                                                                                             
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. at 215. See also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) 
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than it is to the current legal regime which allows for LGBTQ and 
heterosexual promiscuity, serial monogamy, polygamy, and easy, 
no-fault divorce. Serial monogamy, by the way, is the institution by 
which many Americans marry and divorce, and then they remarry, 
always remaining faithful at all times to those to whom they are then 
married. It goes without saying, we should think, that in some re-
spects, serial monogamy is a lot like polygamy, which Professor 
Calabresi opposes because it arguably leads to sex discrimination. 
Even aside from the fact that sexual orientation discrimination 
is a form of sex discrimination, it is also itself a creature of caste, 
which is forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. As discussed 
above, any legislation that treats one group as inherently lesser or 
inferior to other groups is suspect under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
because the Fourteenth Amendment calls for equality between 
groups. We argue that discrimination against gay people, lesbians, 
and transgender people leads to members of these groups being 
treated as outcasts. For example, a mark of caste is limits on inter-
marriage, which is why the bans on same-sex marriage are suspect 
and unconstitutional. 
Insofar as the Fourteenth Amendment bars the creation of caste- 
or class-based legislation, then it also bars the creation of anti-
LGBTQ legislation that aims to limit the rights of gay and lesbian 
couples from marrying one another. Indeed, LGBTQ rights organi-
zations often decry policies limiting gay and lesbian marriage, 
against the opposition of religious groups, on the basis that these 
policies create a form of “second-class citizenship.”205 Indeed, 
“these advocates for same-sex marriage also argue that lack of ac-
cess to marriage constitutes unequal status as citizens, and that this 
denial of full citizenship is tantamount to denigration of gay, lesbian, 
and bisexual [and transgender] identity.”206 
In our view, there are several reasons as to why denying LGBTQ 
couples the right to marry forces them into a state of second-rate 
citizenships, thereby violating the Fourteenth Amendment. This can 
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be seen, first and most simply, in the practical benefits of marriage 
that are denied to LGBTQ people. First, and most simply, marriage 
extends to couples a considerable assortment of benefits. Married 
couples can file their taxes jointly and have a combined income, 
which can help reduce the couple’s tax burden in any given fiscal 
year and makes the couple more appealable to lenders.207 Married 
couples also qualify for an estate tax marital deduction and a gift tax 
marital deduction, offering married couples significant financial 
savings year after year.208 On top of that, married couples can re-
ceive survivor’s benefits from their deceased partner’s pension plan, 
can receive spousal Social Security, Medicare, or disability benefits, 
and can receive veterans’ and military benefits from their spouses, 
such as benefits for education or medical care.209 Moreover, one 
spouse can inherit a share of the other spouse’s estate when he or 
she passes away, and he or she can receive an exemption from both 
estate taxes and gift taxes for all property that is left to the surviving 
spouse.210 In this sense, there are a plethora of economic benefits 
that an individual garners when entering into a marriage. 
There are also health benefits to marriage. Numerous psycho-
logical and sociological studies have proven that married couples 
tend to have better health outcomes, both mentally and physically, 
than their unmarried peers.211 Indeed, a “large body of research links 
marriage with a lower risk of developing cancer, having a heart at-
tack and being diagnosed with dementia and various diseases.”212 It 
seems, then, that marriage not only grants individuals significant 
economic benefits, but also is capable of improving their overall 
health —both emotionally and physically. 
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Moreover, the institution of marriage affords married couples 
rights that are not extended to non-married couples. Namely, 
“[m]arriage establishes the right to a realm of privacy – a right not 
accorded to those who do not or may not marry.”213 For instance, 
marriage “creates a right to private sexual relations” while also ex-
tending to married couples the right to keep their conversations pri-
vate, even from the court of law.214 Thus, laws banning same-sex 
marriage deny same-sex couples the privacy rights that are afforded 
to opposite-sex couples. 
Denying these benefits to LGBTQ couples definitionally forces 
them into a form of second-class citizenship. As stated above, 
LGBTQ couples lose out on the economic benefits, health benefits, 
and legal benefits that straight couples can acquire, simply by virtue 
of the fact that they share the same sex. On face, it seems that ex-
cluding LGBTQ people from garnering these benefits shows that 
they are treated as lesser citizens than traditional heterosexual cou-
ples, inherently subjugating them into a lower class of citizenship. 
Indeed, “these harms create legal and social instability for sexual-
minority families in nearly every aspect of daily living, and they are 
central reasons LGBT families seek the legal recognition of mar-
riage.”215 As such, we argue that laws barring LGBTQ couples from 
entering into marriage are unconstitutional, as they violate the Four-
teenth Amendment by creating a form of caste. 
Additionally, gay and lesbian couples often feel stigmatized and 
socially relegated to a lesser, second-class form of citizenship as a 
direct result of the bans against same-sex marriage.216 Marriage can 
often be a transformative event in one’s life, and has been treated as 
a major and valuable life experience for humans throughout time. 
Children are often raised to perceive marriage as an important land-
mark in their life that they ought to look forward to. Not unlike their 
straight counterparts, LGBTQ couples often place value on the tra-
dition of marriage, and these people likely grew up envisioning the 
moment in which they would walk down the aisle and marry the 
love of their life. Denying same-sex couples the right to engage in 
this culturally-valued tradition inherently treats them as lesser, and 
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banishes them to a form of second-class citizenship. Here, bans on 
same-sex marriage not only violate the Fourteenth Amendment be-
cause they deny same-sex couples access to economic and health 
benefits, but they also deny same-sex couples access to an im-
portant, transformative life event. The quest for marriage rights, 
then, represents “an effort” on the part of LGBTQ activists “to se-
cure the social conditions of human flourishing on equal terms with 
straight citizens.”217 
At the same time, laws banning same-sex marriage appear to 
“enlist” LGBTQ persons “in the enterprise” of relegating them-
selves to a form of second-class citizenship.218 For example, Profes-
sor Dorf contends that: 
Questions of marital status arise not only in interac-
tions with the government but in social settings: reg-
istering children for school, bringing a partner to the 
hospital, at professional gatherings, and so forth. 
Every time the members of a same-sex couple that 
wish to be married but are denied that opportunity 
under state law answer “no” to the question of 
whether they are married, they participate in their 
own oppression. Even apart from the tangible conse-
quences that may result, such denials must surely 
sting - all the worse so because the wounds will be 
experienced as partly self-inflicted.219 
In this sense, laws that ban same-sex marriage not only oppress 
LGBTQ individuals by forcing them into a form of second-class cit-
izenship through the denial of benefits, but they also force LGBTQ 
persons to participate in their own oppression. Clearly, then, laws 
banning same-sex marriage violate the original public meaning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Further, this view of the relationship between marriage and citi-
zenship has been utilized in recent court decisions. For example, the 
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2003 majority opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Court explic-
itly “made this connection between marriage and citizenship,”220 ar-
guing that 
[t]he Massachusetts Constitution affirms the dignity 
and equality of all individuals. It forbids the creation 
of second-class citizens . . . [t]he dissimilitude be-
tween the terms ‘civil marriage’ and ‘civil union’ is 
not innocuous . . . It is a considered choice of lan-
guage that reflects a demonstrable assigning of same-
sex, largely homosexual, couples to second-class sta-
tus.221 
By extension, precedent supports the view that laws banning 
same-sex marriage violate the Fourteenth Amendment by forcing 
LGBTQ persons into a form of second-class citizenship. 
In sum, the Fourteenth Amendment—when read in combination 
with the Nineteenth Amendment—bars the creation of caste- and 
class-based legislation and bars sex discrimination. 
On both counts, an originalist reading of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment would secure a right to same-sex marriage. This is because 
bans on same-sex marriage represent a form of sex discrimination, 
and bans on same-sex marriage banish LGBTQ individuals into a 
form of second-class citizenship, where these people are stripped of 
valuable benefits and are forced into a lower class of society. In this 
sense, an originalist reading of the Fourteenth Amendment would 
require the Supreme Court to defend a right to same-sex marriage.  
In this sense, Obergefell was rightly decided—though on admittedly 
weak originalist footing in the majority opinion—because laws that 
ban same-sex marriage inherently relegate same-sex couples to a 
lower class in society. Thus, same-sex couples deserve equal access 
to the right to marry, as seen within the rich history behind the Four-
teenth Amendment and behind equality jurisprudence in the United 
States. 
In the end, even aside from the equal protection doctrine, all of 
us are born free and equal, and with that freedom comes the right to 
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marry any one person who we choose to marry, without regard to 
his or her race, sex, sexual orientation, or religion. This is the con-
clusion that history and the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment ineluctably lead to. In this sense, same-sex marriage is 
not merely grounded in the policy preferences of the Supreme Court 
or based upon other unfounded arguments. Instead, the history of 
the Equal Protection Clause mandates these conclusions. 
